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A Stackelberg Game for Multi-Period Demand Response Management
in the Smart Grid
Khaled Alshehri, Ji Liu, Xudong Chen, and Tamer Bas¸ar
Abstract— This paper studies a multi-period demand re-
sponse management problem in the smart grid where multiple
utility companies compete among themselves. The user-utility
interactions are modeled by a noncooperative game of a Stack-
elberg type where the interactions among the utility companies
are captured through a Nash equilibrium. It is shown that
this game has a unique Stackelberg equilibrium at which the
utility companies set prices to maximize their revenues (within
a Nash game) while the users respond accordingly to maximize
their utilities subject to their budget constraints. Closed-form
expressions are provided for the corresponding strategies of
the users and the utility companies. It is shown that the multi-
period scheme, compared with the single-period case, provides
more incentives for the users to participate in the game. A
necessary and sufficient condition on the minimum budget
needed for a user to participate is provided.
I. INTRODUCTION
Demand Side Management (DSM) is an essential compo-
nent of the smart grid as it captures important aspects of the
interactions between utility companies (UCs) and consumers,
including residential, commercial, industrial users and ve-
hicles [1]. These aspects can be technical, such as using
advanced metering infrastructure to improve the reliability
and efficiency of the grid [1], or social through agreements
between consumers and energy providers [2]. The cate-
gorization of DSM includes energy efficiency, time-of-use
pricing, and demand response [3]. Energy efficiency is about
the long-term solutions to improve the overall efficiency;
one example is replacing the air conditioning system of
a building with a more efficient one. Through time-of-use
pricing, companies can agree with the users that different
prices are to be charged at different periods; these prices
are agreed on beforehand by both parties. Demand Response
Management (DRM) is the response of consumers’ demands
to price signals from the UCs [4]. DRM allows companies to
manage the consumers’ demands, either directly or indirectly,
through incentive-based programs [5].
Game theory is a powerful mathematical tool that can
lead to effective multi-person decision making [6]. Due to
the nature of the smart grid which features different entities
with conflicting objectives, applying game-theoretic methods
can improve their reliability and efficiency [1], [7]–[16].
For a comprehensive survey of game-theoretic methods for
communications, DSM, and microgrid systems in the smart
grid, we refer to [1].
There are several works where game-theoretic methods
have been applied to DSM/DRM [9]–[16]. An autonomous
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DSM through scheduling of appliances has been imple-
mented within a noncooperative game framework in [9].
The participants in such a game are energy users who are
connected to the same UC and the outcome of the game is the
power consumption schedule of appliances that minimizes
the overall energy cost. Plug-in hybrid electric vehicles can
sometimes have a surplus of energy, and it can be more
beneficial to sell energy quickly instead of holding onto
it. This motivates the work of [10] in which an energy
trading noncooperative game between vehicle groups and
distribution grids has been studied. In [11], joint consumers
discomfort and billing costs minimization within a repeated
game framework has been shown to lead to an optimal DSM
mechanism.
In the smart grid, there are numerous interactions between
UCs and the end-users because of the two-way communica-
tion infrastructure [2]. In order to take this fact into account,
utilizing a multi-level framework such as Stackelberg games
would be very useful [12]–[15]. A multi-level game-theoretic
framework has been developed for demand response man-
agement, where consumers choose their optimal demands in
response to prices announced by different UCs [12]. This
Stackelberg game was shown to have a unique Stackelberg
equilibrium at which UCs maximize their revenues and end-
users maximize their payoff functions. In this framework,
UCs were the leaders of the game and users were the
followers. This framework, though it effectively captures
user-utility interactions, is limited to the single-period case.
In the smart grid, users are expected to be able to schedule
their energy consumption, store or sell surplus energy, based
on their self-interests. With energy scheduling and storage,
users might have a flexibility about when to receive a
certain amount of energy, particularly for shiftable appliances
[9]. Some energy consumption can be scheduled and some
cannot. For example, users might be flexible about doing the
laundry, but not much flexibility is there for refrigerators.
It is worth mentioning that multi-level games for DRM
have been studied in a limited context in the literature. For
example, a four-stage Stackelberg game has been studied
where three stages are at the leader-level (the utility retailer),
and the fourth stage is at the consumer level [13]. Retailers
choose the amount of energy to procure, and the sources to
produce it, in addition to deciding on the price. Consumers
respond to these prices through demand selection. This game
is also a single-period game and it does not take into
account the competition between the UCs, but, it incorporates
other aspects of the decision making at the company-level.
Furthermore, a multi-period Stackelberg game with a single
UC has been formulated with energy storage devices at the
consumers-level [14]. Simulation results show that a Peak-to-
Average Ratio minimization problem leads to similar deci-
sions made within the framework of the game. Additionally,
a noncooperative Stackelberg game between plug-in electric
vehicle groups such as parking lots and the smart grid
was formulated and a socially optimal equilibrium has been
achieved [15]. A two-level game (a noncooperative game
between multiple UCs and an evolutionary game for the users
at the lower level) has been proposed in [16], but this game
is also limited to the single-period case.
There is a need to develop an analytical multi-period,
multi-utility, and a multi-level framework. By introducing
multi-period inter-temporal constraints, we could study a
generalization of [12] to the multi-period case. Our work
differs from the work in [12] at both the user-side and
the company-side. At the user-side, we have an additional
minimum energy constraint that needs to be satisfied across
all periods, while at the company-side, we provide an alter-
native computationally cheap closed-form solution for the
prices. Having such a multi-period framework can make
it possible to accommodate numerous extensions, such as,
energy scheduling and storage, and Peak-to-Average ratio
minimization. To recap, the multi-period scheme has been
considered before in the literature, but most of the studies
are either user-oriented or UC-oriented. Our goal here is to
develop a reliable multi-period framework where numerous
multi-level interactions are also taken into account.
Accordingly, we formulate in this paper a Stackel-
berg game for multi-period-multi-company demand response
management. We derive solutions in closed-form and find
precise expressions for the maximizing demands at the users’
level, and the revenue-maximizing prices for the UCs. We
also prove the existence and uniqueness of the Stackelberg
equilibrium. This work captures the competition between
UCs and the budget limitations at the consumer-level.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows.
The problem is formulated in Section II. The Stackelberg
game along with its solutions in closed form are provided
in Section III. In Section IV, some numerical results are
provided. We conclude the paper in Section V with some
remarks on future directions.
II. PROBLEM FORMULATION
The system consists of K ≥ 1 UCs and N ≥ 1 end-users.
We consider a finite time horizon including T ≥ 1 periods.
Let K = {1,2, . . . ,K} be the set of UCs, N = {1,2, . . . ,N}
be the set of end-users, and T = {1,2, . . . ,T} be the finite
set of time slots. The unit of time can be hour, day, week,
or month. Mathematically, it does not matter which unit the
set T represents.
We model the interaction between UCs and end-users as
a Stackelberg game. Thus, the DRM problem is formulated
as two optimization problems, one is for the followers of
the game and the other is for the leaders of the game.
The followers of the game are the consumers, who can
be residential, commercial, or industrial, and the leaders
of the game are the UCs. On the followers (users) side,
each user has a certain amount of energy demand to meet
and we assume that the users have flexibility to schedule
their consumption of energy. It is also assumed that users
have limited budgets. The goal of each user is to maximize
her utility without exceeding the budget while meeting the
minimum energy demand. On the leaders (UCs) side, the
goal of each UC is to maximize its revenue while its price
setting is influenced by both the competition against other
UCs and the behavior of the users. In the game considered
here, the UCs announce their prices for each period to the
users, and then the users respond accordingly by scheduling
their demands. We discuss the underlying models for both
sides separately below.
A. User-Side
Because of energy scheduling and storage, users may have
some flexibility about when to receive a certain amount of
energy. In our analysis, we are concerned about the total
amount of shiftable energy. For non-shiftable energy, one
can add some period-specific constraints. Additionally, each
user has a budget constraint that she cannot exceed for the
entire time horizon.
The demand of user n∈N from UC k ∈K at time t ∈T
is denoted by dn,k(t), and pk(t) denotes the price of energy
announced by UC k at time t. Each end-user n has a budget
of Bn, and a minimum amount of energy to be met, denoted
by Eminn . The value of Eminn can be thought of as the total
energy needed by user n during the considered total period
(for example, one day or one week). User payoff functions
increase by receiving more energy. The utility of user n is
defined as
Uuser,n = γn ∑
k∈K
∑
t∈T
ln(ζn + dn,k(t)) (1)
where γn and ζn (typically, ζn = 1) are adjustment param-
eters. The logarithmic function is well known to provide
a good demand response [12], [17]. Users aim to maxi-
mize their payoffs as much as possible while meeting this
threshold of minimum amount of energy and not exceeding
a certain budget. To be more precise, given Bn ≥ 0, Eminn ≥ 0,
and pk(t)> 0, the user-side optimization problem is defined
as follows:
maximize
dn,k
Uuser,n
subject to ∑
k∈K
∑
t∈T
pk(t)dn,k(t)≤ Bn (2)
∑
k∈K
∑
t∈T
dn,k(t)≥ Eminn (3)
dn,k(t)≥ 0, ∀k ∈K , ∀t ∈ T (4)
Note that there is no game played among the users. Each user
responds to the price signals using only her local information.
These price signals depend on all the demands selected
by the users and hence users indirectly affect each other’s
decisions.
B. Company-Side
Given the prices of other UCs and the power availability
of UC k at period t, denoted by p−k and Gk(t) respectively,
the total revenue for UC k is given by
Ugen,k(pk,p−k) = ∑
t∈T
pk(t) ∑
n∈N
dn,k(t) (5)
The utility-side optimization problem is then described as
follows:
maximize
pk
Ugen,k(pk,p−k)
subject to ∑
n∈N
dn,k(t)≤ Gk(t), ∀ t ∈T (6)
pk(t)> 0, ∀ t ∈ T (7)
The goal of each UC is to maximize its revenue and
hence maximize its profit. Also, companies want to meet
the consumers’ demands without exceeding the maximum
power availability (overloading the system can cause contin-
gencies). Additionally, because of the market competition,
the prices announced by other companies also affect the
determination of the price at company k. So, company k’s
price selection is actually a response to what other UCs in the
market have announced; this response is also constrained by
the availability of power. Thus, there is a Nash game between
utility companies.
III. THE STACKELBERG GAME
In this section, we first solve the above optimization
problems in closed-form. Then, we study the existence and
uniqueness of Nash equilibrium at the UC-level and the
Stackelberg equilibrium for the entire two-level game.
A. Followers-Side Analysis
Note that the user-side utility function is convex and the
constraints are linear. We start by relaxing the minimum
energy constraint (3) and then find the necessary budget
that makes the maximizing demands feasible. For each user
n∈N , the associated Lagrange function is given as follows:
Luser,n = γn ∑
k∈K
∑
t∈T
ln(ζn + dn,k(t))
−λn,1
(
∑
k∈K
∑
t∈T
p(t)kdn,k(t)−Bn
)
+ ∑
k∈K
∑
t∈T
λn,2(k, t)dn,k(t)
where λn,i’s are the Lagrange multipliers. For optimality, by
Krush-Kuhn-Tucker necessary conditions [18],
∂Luser,n
∂dn,k(t)
= 0, ∀ t ∈ T , ∀ k ∈ K (8)
λn,1
(
∑
k∈K
∑
t∈T
pk(t)dn,k(t)−Bn
)
= 0 (9)
λn,2(k, t)dn,k(t) = 0, ∀ t ∈ T , ∀ k ∈ K (10)
λn,1,λn,2(k, t)≥ 0, ∀ t ∈ T , ∀ k ∈ K (11)
The above conditions are also sufficient because of the
convexity of the optimization problem [19]. In the sequel, we
derive the solution in closed form by discussing two cases.
1) Case 1: dn,k(t)> 0,k ∈ K , t ∈ T : In this case, since
λn,1 > 0 (constraint (2) is active [18]) and λn,2(k, t) = 0 for
all t ∈ T and k ∈K , there holds
∂Luser,n
∂dn,k(t)
=
γn
ζn + dn,k(t) −λn,1pk(t) = 0, ∀ t ∈T , k ∈ K(12)
From (12) and (9), it is straightforward to verify that
dn,k(t) =
Bn +∑k∈K ∑t∈T pk(t)ζn
KT pk(t)
− ζn, ∀ t ∈ T , k ∈ K
(13)
which is a generalization of the single-period case considered
in [12].
2) Case 2: at least one dn,k(t) is zero: We show that
the expression (13) also holds for dn,k(t) ≥ 0, k ∈ K , t ∈
T . Without loss of generality, suppose that dn,1(1) = 0 and
dn,e( f ) > 0 for e ∈ K and f ∈ T , except when (e, f ) =
(1,1). Following a similar analysis as in the previous case,
dn,e( f ) =
Bn +∑e∈K ∑ f∈T pe( f )ζn
(KT − 1)pe( f ) − ζn
Note that since dn,1(1) = 0, there holds
Bn = ζn
(
KT p1(1)− ∑
k∈K
∑
t∈T
pk(t)
)
Thus, it is straightforward to verify that
dn,e( f ) = Bn +∑k∈K ∑t∈T pk(t)ζnKT pe( f ) − ζn
which matches the expression (13). By the budget constraint
(i.e., ∑k∈K ∑t∈T pk(t)dn,k(t) ≤ Bn), we can see that when
dn,k(t) = 0 for all k ∈ K and t ∈ T , user n has a zero
budget (i.e., Bn = 0). The announced prices cannot be infinite
because of the nature of the Stackelberg equilibrium, as we
discuss later. The following theorem states the necessary and
sufficient condition for Bn so that the above dn,k(t)’s are
guaranteed to be feasible.
Theorem 1: For each user n ∈ N , the demand dn,k(t)
given by (13) is feasible if and only if
Bn ≥ max{ fn,1, fn,2}
where
fn,1 = ζn
(
KT pk(t)− ∑
k∈K
∑
t∈T
pk(t)
)
fn,2 = E
min
n + ζnKT
∑k∈K ∑t∈T 1KT pk(t)
− ζn ∑
k∈K
∑
t∈T
pk(t)
Proof: Suppose first that Bn ≥ fn,1. Then,
Bn ≥ ζn(KT pk(t)− ∑
k∈K
∑
t∈T
pk(t)) ∀k ∈ K , t ∈ T
which leads to
Bn + ζn ∑k∈K ∑t∈T pk(t)
KT pk(t)
− ζn ≥ 0 ∀k ∈ K , t ∈ T
Thus, the inequality Bn ≥ fn,1 implies that the non-negativity
condition is satisfied. Next suppose that Bn ≥ fn,2. Then,
Bn ≥
Eminn + ζnKT
∑k∈K ∑t∈T 1KT pk(t)
− ζn ∑
k∈K
∑
t∈T
pk(t)
Thus,
Bn + ζn ∑
k∈K
∑
t∈T
pk(t)≥
Eminn + ζnKT
∑k∈K ∑t∈T 1KT pk(t)
from which we have
∑
k∈K
∑
t∈T
Bn + ζn ∑k∈K ∑t∈T pk(t)
KT pk(t)
− ∑
k∈K
∑
t∈T
ζn ≥ Eminn
This leads to
∑
k∈K
∑
t∈T
dn,k(t)≥ Eminn
With this, the inequality Bn ≥ fn,2 implies that the minimum
energy need is satisfied. Combining both conditions, we
conclude that the condition
Bn ≥ max{ fn,1, fn,2}
guarantees that the maximizing demand in (13) is feasible.
Now suppose that
Bn + ζn ∑k∈K ∑t∈T pk(t)
KT pk(t)
− ζn ≥ 0 ∀k ∈ K , t ∈ T
It follows that
Bn ≥ ζn(KT pk(t)− ∑
k∈K
∑
t∈T
pk(t)) ∀k ∈ K , t ∈ T
which implies that Bn ≥ fn,1. Finally, suppose that
∑
k∈K
∑
t∈T
dn,k(t) = ∑
k∈K
∑
t∈T
(
Bn + ζn ∑k∈K ∑t∈T pk(t)
KT pk(t)
− ζn)
≥ Eminn
Then,
∑
k∈K
∑
t∈T
Bn + ζn ∑k∈K ∑t∈T pk(t)
KT pk(t)
≥ Eminn +KTζn
By re-arranging, we have
Bn ≥
Eminn + ζnKT
∑k∈K ∑t∈T 1KT pk(t)
− ζn ∑
k∈K
∑
t∈T
pk(t) = fn,2
from which it follows that Bn ≥ max{ fn,1, fn,2} when the
demand is feasible.
B. Leaders-Side Analysis
Given the prices set by the other companies and subject to
the power availability constraint (6), each UC (leader) aims
to determine its most profitable prices. At the leaders level,
there is a noncooperative game in which each UC chooses
its optimal prices in response to the prices set by the other
UCs. The revenue function of company k is an increasing
function of the consumers’ demands ∑n∈N dn,k(t). Thus, the
optimality is reached when the equality in (6) holds. We
apply the solutions derived in the users-side analysis (which
was a function of the prices) here and show that in the case
when the equality in (6) is satisfied, the corresponding prices
constitutes the best response of UC k subject to the prices
set by the other UCs.
With the equality in (6) and relation (13), there holds
∑n∈N Bn +∑n∈N ζn ∑k∈K ∑t∈T pk(t)
KT pk(t)
= ∑
n∈N
ζn +Gk(t), ∀ t ∈T
Let Z =∑n∈N ζn and B=∑n∈N Bn. Then, for each company
k ∈K ,
B+Z ∑
k∈K
∑
t∈T
pk(t) = KT pk(t)(Gk(t)+Z), ∀ t ∈ T
Note that the double summation includes pk(t) and all the
other prices. Thus,
B+Z ∑
e∈K
∑
h∈T
pe(h) = KT pk(t)(Gk(t)+Z)− pk(t)Z,
∀ t ∈T , ∀ k ∈ K , (e,h) 6= (k, t)
(14)
Note that the equations in (14) can be combined into a linear
equation
AP = Y
where A is a KT ×KT matrix whose diagonal entries are
KT (Gk(t)+Z)−Z, k ∈ K , t ∈ T , and off-diagonal entries
all equal −Z, P is a vector in RKT stacking pk(t), k ∈ K ,
t ∈ T , and Y a vector in RKT whose entries all equal B.
The following theorem shows that matrix A is invertible
and the revenue-maximizing prices are positive and unique.
Theorem 2: The following statements are true.
1) The matrix A is nonsingular and the prices announced
by company k ∈ K at time t ∈ T are uniquely given
by
pk(t) =
B
Gk(t)+Z
(
1
KT −∑k∈K ∑t∈T ZGk(t)+Z
)
(15)
2) The above prices are always positive.
3) The price given by (15) constitutes the best response
of company k to the prices set by other companies.
Proof:
1) The matrix A can be represented as
A =


KT (G1(1)+Z) 0 . . . 0
0 KT (G1(2)+Z) . . . 0
.
.
.
.
.
.
0 . . . 0 KT (GK(T )+Z)


+


−Z
−Z
.
.
.
−Z


(
1 . . .1
)
:= ˆA+uvT
Note that ˆA is invertible (diagonal matrix with nonzero
diagonal elements). By Sherman-Morrison Formula
[20], if ˆA is invertible and 1+ vT ˆA−1u 6= 0, then
( ˆA+ uvT )−1 = ˆA−1−
ˆA−1uvT ˆA−1
1+ vT ˆA−1u
Note that
1+ vT ˆA−1u = 1−
(
1 . . .1
)


1
KT (G1(1)+Z)
0 . . . 0
0 1KT (G1(2)+Z) . . . 0
.
.
.
.
.
.
0 . . . 0 1KT (GK (T )+Z)




Z
Z
.
.
.
Z


= 1−
1
KT ∑k∈K ∑t∈T
Z
Gk(t)+Z
Since Gk(t) > 0 and Z > 0, each element in the
summation is less than 1 and overall value of the
summation is less than KT , and this clearly leads to
1+ vT ˆA−1u 6= 0. Note that
ˆA−1uvT ˆA−1 =
−Z
(KT )2
×

1
(G1(1)+Z)2
. . . . . .
1
(G1(1)+Z)(GK (T )+Z)
1
(G1(1)+Z)(G1(2)+Z)
1
(G1(2)+Z)2
. . .
1
(G1(2)+Z)(GK (T )+Z)
.
.
.
.
.
.
1
(G1(1)+Z)(GK (T )+Z)
. . . . . .
1
(GK (T )+Z)2


Thus,
A−1 =


1
KT (G1(1)+Z)
0 . . . 0
0 1KT (G1(2)+Z) . . . 0
.
.
.
.
.
.
0 . . . 0 1KT (GK (T )+Z)


+
Z
(KT )2 −KT ∑k∈K ∑t∈T ZGk(t)+Z
×


1
(G1(1)+Z)2
. . . . . .
1
(G1(1)+Z)(GK (T )+Z)
1
(G1(1)+Z)(G1(2)+Z)
1
(G1(2)+Z)2
. . .
1
(G1(2)+Z)(GK (T )+Z)
.
.
.
.
.
.
1
(G1(1)+Z)(GK (T )+Z)
. . . . . .
1
(GK (T )+Z)2


Since P = A−1Y , the price selection is uniquely given
by
pk(t)=
B
KT (Gk(t)+Z)
(
1+
∑k∈K ∑t∈T ZGk(t)+Z
KT −∑k∈K ∑t∈T ZGk(t)+Z
)
(16)
which simplifies to the expression (15).
2) Suppose that to the contrary, pk(t)≤ 0, this leads to
B
KT (Gk(t)+Z)
(
1+
∑k∈K ∑t∈T ZGk(t)+Z
KT −∑k∈K ∑t∈T ZGk(t)+Z
)
≤ 0
for some t and k. Note that since BKT (Gk(t)+Z) is non-
negative, there holds
1+
∑k∈K ∑t∈T ZGk(t)+Z
KT −∑k∈K ∑t∈T ZGk(t)+Z
≤ 0
This implies that
∑
k∈K
∑
t∈T
Z
Gk(t)+Z
≤−
(
KT − ∑
k∈K
∑
t∈T
Z
Gk(t)+Z
)
and hence KT ≤ 0. But K ≥ 1 and T ≥ 1. Thus, this
is a contradiction. Therefore, we conclude that pk(t)>
0 ∀t ∈ T ,k ∈ K .
3) Given the prices announced by other UCs, suppose
that a UC k announces a price of p′k(t) = pk(t)+ ε at
a fixed time t. If ε < 0, the company will decrease its
price. But, the total demand from all users from UC
k cannot exceed the power availability (recall that the
solution in 1) happens when all the available power
is being sold). Since the revenue at time t is the total
demand multiplied by the price, UC k does not achieve
a higher revenue when ε < 0. Now suppose that ε > 0;
this leads to
Ugen,k(p′k(t),p−k(t))−Ugen,k(pk(t),p−k(t))
= (pk(t)+ ε)
B+Z ∑t∈T pk(t)+Zε
KT (pk(t)+ ε)
−(pk(t)+ ε)Z− pk(t)
B+Z ∑t∈T pk(t)
KT pk(t)
+Zpk(t)
= −Zε
KT − 1
KT
But KT ≥ 1 and Z ≥ 1. Thus, if ε > 0, the UC does
not achieve a higher revenue. Therefore, for every
period t, company k does not benefit from deviating
from (15). Since this applies to every period, it applies
for the entire time horizon because of the linearity of
the revenue function (it is a linear combination of the
demands multiplied by the prices).
In practice, due to production costs and market regulations,
pk(t) cannot be outside the range of some lower and upper
bounds [pmink (t), pmaxk (t)] for all t ∈ T and k ∈ K , as in
[12]. If pk(t) < pmink (t), then pk(t) is set to pmink (t), and
similarly for the upper-bound, if pk(t) > pmaxk (t), then we
set pk(t) = pmaxk (t). The expression (15) will still hold for
the other prices because of the convexity of the problem.
Remark 1: Using the expression (5), it can be verified that
the revenue function for UC k is
Ugen,k(pk,p−k) = ∑
t∈T
pk(t) ∑
n∈N
dn,k(t)
= ∑
t∈T
pk(t)(
∑n∈N Bn +∑n∈N ζn ∑k∈K ∑t∈T pk(t)
KT pk(t)
− ∑
n∈N
ζn)
= ∑
t∈T
B+Z ∑k∈K ∑t∈T pk(t)
KT
−Z ∑
t∈T
pk(t)
=
B
K
+
Z(∑k∈K ∑t∈T pk(t)−K ∑t∈T pk(t))
K
(17)
We can see that the revenue function of each company
depends on the price selections of other companies and thus
it is appropriate to use the notion of Nash equilibrium.
Remark 2: Since Z = ∑n∈N ζn and ζn is typically 1, the
value of Z typically equals N. In this case, by (15), we
observe that for any given Gk(t)’s,
pk(t)(Gk(t)+Z) = pk(t)(Gk(t)+N)
which is a constant for all t ∈T and k∈K . Thus, the power
availability is inversely proportional to the prices.
Remark 3: Theorem 2 provides a computationally cheap
expression for the prices. Since pk(t) can be directly com-
puted using (15), there is no need to numerically compute
A−1 or |A|. This enables us to deal with a large number
of periods or UCs, without worrying about computational
complexity.
C. Existence and Uniqueness of the Stackelberg Equilibrium
Companies play a noncooperative game at the market level
and announce their prices to the consumers. As discussed
above, consumers optimally respond to these prices and the
response of user n∈N is uniquely given by (13). We assume
that the participants of the game at the followers level have
a sufficient budget to participate (derived in Theorem 1).
Denote the strategy space of user (follower in the game)
n ∈ N by Fn and the strategy space of all users by F =
F1×·· ·×FN . Denote the strategy space of UC (a leader in
the game) k ∈K at t ∈T by Lk,t := [pmink (t), pmaxk (t)]. Note
that pk(t)∈Lk,t for all t ∈T and k∈K . The strategy space
of UC k for the entire time horizon is Lk =Lk,1×·· ·×Lk,T
and the strategy space of all companies is L = L1 × ·· ·×
LK . Before stating our main theorem, we need the following
game-theoretic concepts from [6].
The vector of prices p∗ ∈ L constitutes a Nash equilib-
rium for the price selection game at the UCs-level if
Ugen,k(p∗k ,p∗−k)≥Ugen,k(pk,p−k∗), ∀ pk ∈ Lk
For given price selections (p1, . . . , pK) ∈L1×·· ·×LK , the
optimal response from all users is
d∗(p) = {d∗1(p),d∗2(p), . . . ,d∗N(p)}
where for each n ∈ N , d∗n(p) is the unique maximizer for
Uuser,n(dn,p) over dn ∈ Fn. For the game considered here,
the Stackelberg equilibrium is defined as (d∗(p),p∗).
In general, in Stackelberg games, the response from the
followers has to be unique for the equilibrium to be well
defined [6]. In the game here, due to market competition,
leaders aim to choose their prices in the most profitable
way while taking into account what other leaders are doing.
We capture the competition on the leaders’ level through a
Nash game. We note that in the parlance of dynamic game
theory [6], we are dealing here with open-loop information
structures, with the corresponding equilibria at the utilities
level being open-loop Nash equilibrium. Therefore, this is a
one-shot game at which all the prices for the all periods are
announced at the beginning of the game, and the followers
respond to these prices by solving their local optimization
problems. We have the following theorem:
Theorem 3: The following statements are true.
1) There exists a unique (open-loop) Nash equilibrium for
the noncooperative game at the leaders’ level.
2) There exists a unique (open-loop) Stackelberg equilib-
rium.
3) The maximizing demands given by (13) and the
revenue-maximizing prices given in Theorem 2 con-
stitute the (open-loop) Stackelberg equilibrium for the
demand response management game.
Proof:
1) Note that the set Lk,t := [pmink (t), pmaxk (t)] ∈R is com-
pact (closed and bounded) ∀t ∈T ,k ∈K . Thus, L =
L1×·· ·×LK is compact subset of RKT . Furthermore,
∂ 2Ugen,k(pk(t),p−k)
∂ p2k(t)
= 0 ∀t ∈ T ,k ∈ K
since the revenue function is convex and concave
in pk(t). Hence, there exists a Nash equilibrium for
the noncooperative game at the leaders level [6]. By
Theorem 2, pk(t) that constitutes the best response of
company k ∈ K to prices set by other companies is
uniquely given by (15). Thus, the Nash equilibrium is
unique.
2) From 1), a unique Nash equilibrium exists at which the
maximizing prices are announced to the consumers.
Since the maximizing demands were uniquely given
by (13), then there exists a unique Stackelberg equi-
librium.
3) Immediately follows from Theorem 2 and parts 1)-2)
IV. NUMERICAL RESULTS
We conducted numerical computations capturing different
scenarios. In the first case, we set T = 1 and compute the
results with the same parameters values as in the single-
period case [12]. Here, for n∈N , we have ζn = 1 and γn = 1.
Additionally, K = 3, N = 5, B1 varies from 2 to 42, B2 = 10,
B3 = 15, B4 = 20, and B5 = 25. The power availabilities are
G1(1) = 10, G2(1) = 15, and G3(1) = 20. Figure 1 shows
that the results matches the single-period case given in [12].
This is expected since the multi-period Stackelberg game is
a generalization of the single-period one. Now, we let T = 4,
an interpretation for which can be the following: morning,
afternoon, evening, and late night. The budgets of consumers
are kept the same, and as before, B1 still varies from 2 to
42. The total power availability for each company is also
kept at the same level, but distributed across the 4 periods
as follows: 25%, 40%, 25%, and 10%. Figure 2 shows that
with the same total power availability for each company,
and without increasing any of the consumers’ budgets, the
utilities for users increase significantly (almost doubles for
user 1). The total demands for the users do not change, since
they match the power availability. The trend for the revenues
is similar to the single-period case. One key observation is
that the multi-period scheme provides more incentives for
consumers’ participation (can be shown analytically), which
is quite important and a key issue [2]. Finally, we now
increase the number of users and study the behaviors with
a varying T . Here, T varies from 1 to 50, N = 50, K = 1,
G1(t) = 300T ∀ t ∈ T (so, the power availability is equally
distributed among all periods). B1−10 = 5, B11−20 = 10,
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Fig. 1. Computations with 5 users, T = 1, and varying B1
B21−30 = 15, B31−40 = 20, and B41−50 = 25. Figure 3 shows
that the previous observation again holds, and increasing the
number of the periods provides more incentives for users’
participation without affecting the revenue of the company.
V. CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE DIRECTIONS
In this paper, we have studied the multi-period DRM prob-
lem through game-theoretic methods. In particular, we have
developed a Stackelberg game to capture the interactions
between UCs and energy consumers in which UCs are the
leaders and the users are the followers of the game. The
UCs play a noncooperative game, which was shown to have
a unique equilibrium at which companies maximize their
revenues in response to price decisions made by the other
companies. Then, the users optimally respond to the price
selection made by UCs, by choosing the utility maximizing
demand. The overall hierarchal interaction admits a unique
Stackelberg equilibrium. Furthermore, closed-form solutions
have been derived, and numerical results have shown that
the multi-period scheme provides more incentives for the
participation of energy consumers.
There are numerous opportunities for future work. Incor-
porating the economic dispatch problem at the UC level is
one possible direction. Another direction is to study energy
scheduling and storage at the consumers level. Moreover,
as this paper has focused on shiftable energy need at the
consumer level, another opportunity is to study the addition
of some period-specific energy need constraints.
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